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STUDENT NOTES
INJUNCTIONS -

LABOR INJUNCTIONS BOUND

PERSONS

Contempt proceedings were brought by the state on the relation
of a coal mining corporation against certain individuals for violation of an injunction against unlawfully interfering with the employees of the corporation. The alleged contemnors were not
parties to the injunction suit nor named in the decree, it merely
naming the president of the United Mine Workers of America, a
number of the members of such organization, and "all other persons whatsoever and whomsoever" as those to be enjoined.
The
circuit court gave a judgment of conviction, which on writ of
error to the Supreme Court of Appeals was reversed and the proceedings dismissed, on the ground that neither the petitions nor
affidavits showed that respondents in the contempt proceedings
were servants or agents of defendants named in the decree, or
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that they acted in collusion with them, which was necessary in
order to make them amenable to the decree.'
The scope of the injunction, in the sense of what persons
should be bound by it, has been constantly increasing. Many of
the earlier cases laid down the broad proposition that a person not
a party to an action could not be put in contempt for disobedience
to an injunction.! The courts soon recognized, however, that the
attorneys, agents, or tenants of parties defendant should be bound
by the injunction though not themselves parties to the suit,8 and
that injunctions against representatives of a class should bind the
class.' The next step was easily taken, so that courts now almost
universally hold that anyone who knowingly assists a person
named in the injunction to violate it may be held in contempt."
That such persons should be considered in contempt seems easily
sustainable on principle. The contempt process is as extensive
as necessary to meet the practical requirements of a sanction which
will sustain the court's authority.
But many courts now have gone beyond the simple principles
of contempt of court, and have attempted to extend the very jurisdiction of the court by adding to the decree the all-inclusive
phrase "all persons whomsoever".' The only requisite for con'State ex rel. Ben Franklin Coal Co. v. Lewis, 168 S. E. 812 (W. Va. 1933).
In State ez rel. Mineral State Coal Co. v. Komar, 168 S. E. 810 (W. Va. 1933),
a companion case, the result was the same on a very similar state of facts.
The only difference between the two cases is that in the latter case the decree did not contain the broad phrase "all persons whatsoever and whomsoever,)" but merely enjoined a large number of persons therein named from
causing the employees of the mining corporation to terminate their contracts
of service with it.
2
Watson v. Fuller, 9 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 425 (1854); Barthe v. Larquie,
42 La. Ann. 131, 7 So. 80 (1890).
3Fowler v. Beckman, 66 N. H. 424, 30 AtL 1117 (1891); People ex ref.
Empire Leasing Co. v. Mecca Realty Co., 174 App. Div. 384 (N. Y. 1916);
(1910) 23 L. R. A . (N. S.) 1295; (1921) 15 A. L. R. 387, collects many
eases.
'.Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 366,41 S. C. 383 (1921):
"Being thus represented, we think it must necessarily follow that their rights were
concluded by the original decree."
See Berger v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 175 Cal. 719, 167 Pac. 143 (1917); and Shaughnessey v. Jordon, 184 Ind. 499, 111 N. E. 622 (1916), holding specifically as to labor
unions that when an injunction is granted against the leaders of the union,
and the members are too numerous to serve, the members will be punished
for violating the injunctive order.
rEmployers' Teaming Co. v. Teamsters' Joint Council, 141 Fed. 679 (C.
C. A. 7th 1908); Garrigan v. U. S., 163 Fed. 16, 89 C. C. A. 494, 23 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1295, certiorari denied, U. S. v. Garrigan, 214 U. S. 514, 29 S.
Ct. 696 (1909).
6 The famous case of In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900 (1895) gave the
notion great impetus, though it did not involve a decision upholding such a
decree as properly issued. See also American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921); sub non. Arm-
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tempt proceedings under these sweeping injunctions is that the
person violating it had actual knowledge that such an injunction
existed." Under this doctrine "publicity is the only limit to the
injunction's authority."'
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals seems, therefore, in the two recent cases,' definitely to be placing its
stamp of disapproval upon "government by injunction."'"
It
tacitly rebukes the lower court for granting a decree with the
broad wording by ignoring the "all persons" phrase as a nullity."
Thus the court has not misconceived its jurisdiction and has kept
the contempt process in bounds
strong et al. v. U. S., 18 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 7th 1927); an unreported
coal strike injunction issued in 1919 in U. S. v. Frank J. Hayes, reprinted
in SAi,
CASES ON LABOR LAw (1922) 757, and in Hearings on S. 1482,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1928) 524.
7Bz parte Lennon, 166 U. S. 584 (1897); Hutchins v. Munn, 78 App. D.
C. 271 (1906), decree affirmed 209 U. S. 246, 28 S. Ct. 504; Mears Slayton
Lumber Co. v. District Council of Chicago of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 156 Ill.
App. 327 (1910). "Even persons
acting independently have been held guilty of contempt for doing an act,
knowing it was enjoined," (1907) 21 HAav. L. REv. 220, citing Chisoim v.
Caines, 121 Fed. 397 (C. C. D. S. C. 1903). Also see Puget Sound Traction,
Light and Power Co. v. Lowrey, 202 F. (2d) 63 (U. S. D. C. Wash. 1913);
Harris v. Hutchison, 160 Iowa 149, 140 N. W. 830, 44 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1035
(1913).
'Frankfurter and Greene, The Use of the Injunction in American Labor
Controversies (1929) 45 L. Q. REV. 19, 52. And there are other statements
that seem to go so far as to consider simply constructive notice, opportunity
for knowledge, sufficient to bind these "all persons" without the showing
that they had actual knowledge. "When due notice is given of an injunction
order addressed to 'all persons generally', by publishing and posting copies
in conspicuous places, all the world is bound by it . . . . Any interference
with the property or rights protected by it renders the offender liable for
contempt of court"; Bryan, Injunctions Against Strikes (1906) 40 AM. L.
REv. 42, and Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 1311, 1315: "In some instances
wide publicity given to the decree, or knowledge that a suit likely to result
in an injunction has been begun has been deemed sufficient" (citing cases).
'State ex rel. Ben Franklin Coal Co. v. Lewis, State ez rel. Mineral State
Coal Co. v. Komar, both supra n. 1.
2See Ralston, Government by Injunction (1920) 5 CoIm
L. Q. 424;
Bouney, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes (1923) 7 MiN. L. REV. 467;
Kerr, Evolution of the Injunction as an Arm of the Government (1924) 10
VA. L. REV. 444; Note (1897) 31 Am. L. REv. 761; Note (1928) 32 LAw
NoTEs 1.
" The State ex rel. Ben Franklin Coal Co. v. Lewis case, supra n. 1.
SAn exact precedent for this position of the W. Va. Ct. is found in Straw.
berry Island Co. v. Cowles, 79 Misc. Rep. 279, 140 N. Y. Supp. 333 (1912),
which holds that one not a party to a suit cannot be prosecuted for disobeying an injunction entered pursuant to the agreement of the parties
merely because it restrains "all persons whomsoever", unless he acted as
agent of, or in collusion with, the actual parties. And this seems to be the
more generally accepted view; see Rigas v. Livingston, 178 N. Y. 20, 70
N. E. 107 (1904); Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 1311, 1312; (1921) 15 A.
L. R. 387, 396.
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The West Virginia decisions are in keeping with the strong
tendency to limit by statute the use of injunctions in labor controversies.'
After eighteen years of the abortive Clayton Act,'
Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Bill,'
which embodies substantial restrictions upon labor injunctions in
the federal courts; and several states already have anti-injunction
legislation on their books." Thus until the West Virginia legislature can see its way clear to provide this state with some check
upon this attempted extension of jurisdiction by the equity courts,
"The harshness of the criticism directed at these labor injunctions,
the insistence of the demands that they be limited, have been the subject
comment by many of the law reviews. For example, see: "The modern
of the Writ of Injunction, especially in labor disputes, is revolutionary
destructive of popular government .

. .

and
for
use
and

. Discreet equity power and juris-

diction is invading the field of government by law and endangering constitutional liberty, the personal liberty of the individual citizen. As government by gquity,--personal government-advances, republican governmentgovernment by law-recedes."
Furuseth, Government by Injunction-The
Misuse of the Equity Power (1910) 71 CENT. L. J. 5. "Labor's denunciation of the courts' attitude in industrial controversies knows no bounds."
Witte, Social Consequences of Injunctions in Labor Disputes (1930) 24 ILL.
L. REv. 772, 783.
1 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (1927). The labor sections of
this act have been construed by the Supreme Court to have made no change
in the law except to confer the right of trial by jury in a restricted class of
contempt cases. The leading cases construing these sections are: Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Dering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921); Michaelson v. U. S., 266 U. S. 42, 45 S. Ct. 18 (1924); and American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, supra n. 6.
547 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. P. P. § 101 ff. (1933). This bill
deals mostly with the conditions under which the inferior federal courts may
issue injunctions in labor disputes and the procedure which is to be followed
in such cases. "The new act is not a magna charta nor a comprehensive
labor code, but it is a practical measure which will put an end to 'yellow dog
contracts' and to at least the most serious abuses of injunctions."
Witte,
The Federal Anti-Injunction Act (1932) 16 MiNN. L. REV. 638, 658. See
also a thorough discussion of the desirability of such legislation by Frankfurter and Greene, Labor Injunctions and Federal Legislation (1929) 42
HARv. L. REV. 766.
"Wisconsin has adopted the model state anti-injunction bill with some
additions. Wis. Laws (1931), c. 376. Ex parte temporary restraining orders
are prohibited or restricted in Minn. Laws (1929), c. 260; N. Y. Laws (1930),
c. 378; Pa. Laws (1931), Act 310; Wis. Stat. (1931), § 133.07(2). Jury
trial in certain classes of contempt cases under injunctions in labor disputes
are, N. J. Laws (1921) c. 169; Okla. Const. art. II, § 25 and Okla. Rev. L.
(1909) § 2229; Pa. Laws (1931) Act. 311; Utah Laws (1917), c. 68, § 5;
Wis. Laws 1931, § 113.07(4).
1' It is to be noted however, that it might be possible to defeat the W. Va.
court's intention thus to'limit the scope of the injunction, by the device of
the class or representative suit, which has been authorized in some jurisdictions specifically as to labor unions. See language and cases cited supra n. 4.
Specific representatives of the union would be sued for the whole union, then
the injunction would without possibility for argument apply to all of the
then members of the union.
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it seems that the West Virginia Supreme Court shows wisdom in
doing its part to confine the injunctive remedy within its proper
strict limits.17

-Tuxy

M. PETERS.

Collaterally, it is to be noted that a union may not be enjoined from
a lawful strike merely because a few of its members unauthorizedly use unlawful methods. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woolworkers' Local
Union, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877 (1905).
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